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TILTING THE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD:
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION MEETS
LEGAL THEORY
Sheila Suess Kennedy*
INTRODUCTION
There is an old story about two businessmen who take a
quarrel to the village Rabbi. He listens to the first man tell his
side, and says, “Yes, you are right.” The second man then gives
his version of the affair, and once again the Rabbi says, “You are
right.” At that point, an onlooker protests, “They can’t both be
right!” To this the Rabbi responds, “Ah, yes, you also are
right.” American public administrators increasingly find
themselves in the position of that Rabbi, needing to acknowledge
the legitimacy of competing claims on the government that are
seemingly both correct and but are mutually exclusive. Wanting
to be fair, we are torn between programs intended to ameliorate
past injustices and complaints that the programs themselves are
unjust.
The idea of equality is a bedrock element of the American
legal and political systems; we strive for a meritocracy and
affirm the government’s obligation to treat similarly situated
citizens equally. The ‘level playing field’ is a favorite metaphor
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for politicians and public administrators alike. Whether a playing
field is truly level, however, is often a contentious issue. This
article analyzes the constitutional requirements of equal treatment
against claims arising in the context of affirmative action and
charitable choice, programs whose proponents claim that the field
must “tilt” if genuine equality is to be achieved. But, if
government must treat people differently—that is, unequally—to
achieve real equality, what are the implications for public policy,
public management and the rule of law? Indeed, how are we to
define equality so that, to appropriate Justice Stewart’s famous
approach to obscenity, I will “know it when I see it”?1
I.

JUSTICE, FAIRNESS & DIFFERENCE

The notion of the level playing field has been invoked
politically as a necessary condition of democracy, a convenient
metaphor for saying that a democracy, defined anywhere along
the spectrum, presupposes the absence of a wide disparity in the
participatory capabilities of the citizenry.2 Political equality has
been deemed present when “the decision rule for determining
outcomes at the decisive stage must take into account, and take
equally into account, the expressed preferences of each member
of the demos as to the outcome.”3 This construct, of course, begs
1

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(discussing the difficulty in defining obscenity).
2
See, e.g., Michael J. Goldberg, Derailing Union Democracy: Why
Deregulation Would Be a Mistake, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 137
(2002) (discussing the importance of a level playing field as a basic safeguard
of democracy).
3
Robert A. Dahl, Procedural Democracy, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND
SOCIETY 97 (Peter Laslett & James Fishkin eds., 1979) (examining the idea of
procedural democracy and the problem of inclusion, and examining various
solutions to the problem of inclusion, including his own). Procedural
democracy is the idea that certain criteria should govern the decision-making
process of any human association. Id. at 101. Such criteria include political
equality (decisions must take into account the preferences of each member
equally), effective participation (members must have adequate and equal
opportunity to express individual preferences) and enlightened understanding
(members must have adequate and equal opportunity to discover and evaluate
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the question of equal access to membership, among other things.
Philosophers have gone beyond such narrow rules of political
participation in describing the role of equality in a just society.
Aristotle defined as a fundamental attribute of justice the
principle that equals should be treated equally, begging the
questions “who are equals?” and “what constitutes equal
treatment?” John Rawls proposes that we construct our legal and
political system behind a veil of ignorance: if we do not know
beforehand what our personal attributes or social station will be,
the theory goes, we will be more likely to construct a system that
is fair to all, even where it may be unequal.4 Amartya Sen argues
that, no matter how many rights individuals may have, if material
conditions are such that those individuals cannot freely choose
their ends—if they are so afflicted by disease or constrained by
custom or poverty that they are not truly free to choose their own
goals—they are neither free nor equal.5
Virtually all political philosophies exalt equality as an ideal,
but as Ian Hacking wryly noted, there is a wide variety of
individual preferences). Id. at 101-05. The problem of inclusion relates to the
membership of the association, i.e., who has a right to be included in the
association and who can properly be excluded. Id. at 109.
4
John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 3 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 223, 235 (1985). Specifically, Rawls argues:
We must find some point of view, removed from and not distorted by
the particular features and circumstances of the all-encompassing
background framework, from which a fair agreement between free
and equal persons can be reached. The original position, with the
feature I have called ‘the veil of ignorance,’ is this point of view.
And the reason why the original position must abstract from and not
be affected by the contingencies of the social world is that the
conditions for a fair agreement on the principals of political justice
between free and equal persons must eliminate the bargaining
advantages which inevitably arise within the background institutions
of any society as the result of cumulative social, historical and natural
tendencies.
Id.
5
AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 66-69, 102-107 (Harvard
Univ. Press 1992). See also Ian Hacking, In Pursuit of Happiness, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Sept. 19, 1996, at 40 (reviewing AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY
REEXAMINED (1992)).
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working definitions of the term.6 Libertarians want equality of
rights, or equality before the law. Egalitarians want equality of
results in varying formulations.7 Free market advocates want
equal access to markets.8 Americans speak often of “equality of
opportunity” a term often defined as the opportunity to compete
on . . . what else? A level playing field. And so we come full
circle, having consistently avoided the crucial question, “equality
of what?”
Unless we are able to define the “what,” we will be similarly
unable to decide what sorts of differences require recognition if
genuine equality is to be achieved. Even if we are talking simply
about equal rights before the law, using the narrowest possible
construction of that term, a fair and equal system must take note
of and allow for differences between children and adults,
competent and incompetent persons, motorists and pedestrians,
and so forth. All but the most doctrinaire egalitarians will allow
for differences in need resulting from a variety of factors,
including behavior and effort. As Will Kymlicka noted, in other
countries it is “increasingly accepted that some forms of cultural
difference can only be accommodated through special legal or
constitutional measures, above and beyond the common rights of

6

Hacking, supra note 5, at 41-42 (noting the different theories of equality
and discussing how Sen’s focus on “equality of what” deviates from the
previous focus on “equality for whom”).
7
Many years ago I read a wonderful science fiction story, the name of
which I have unfortunately long forgotten, describing a society so obsessed
with the egalitarian version of equality that persons who could run fast were
weighted down with sandbags; those with high I.Q.s required to wear
earphones playing distracting music, and so forth. For further discussion of
egalitarian theories, see MICHAEL QUINN, JUSTICE AND EGALITARIANISM vi,
41 (1991) (stating that at the core of egalitarian theories of justice is the notion
that society should ensure that individuals have the same ability to make
reasoned choices, thus allowing for each person to equally consider his or her
choices in life). However, Quinn notes that theorists, including Rawls,
Dworkin and Nozick, differ in how this ideal should be accomplished and
what stands in the way of accomplishing it. Id. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1999).
8
See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
(1997).
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citizenship.”9 These systems recognize that applying the same
rules to everyone does not necessarily treat everyone as equal.
Further complicating the issue of difference, and the
importance we should assign to it in an effort to define equality,
is the significance of labels or framing. In the introduction to
Making All the Difference Martha Minow tells the story of animal
behaviorist Harold Herzog, Jr., who works in a laboratory at the
University of Tennessee and must obtain approval for any
experiment on the 15,000 or so mice they use each year.10 Yet
the concern over mouse welfare does not extend to those that
escape and are subsequently labeled “pests,” nor to field mice
that might get into the building.11 Those mice are routinely
captured and destroyed.12 Similarly, other mice are used as food
for other experimental animals, and likewise fall outside the rules
governing appropriate treatment.13 Finally, and ironically, when a
pet mouse owned by Herzog’s son died the family gave “Willie”
a funeral, complete with a tombstone.14 The moral of the story,
as both Herzog and Minow note, is that our sense of equitable
behavior depends heavily upon the labels we assign and the
language with which we describe the situation and categories
before us.15 Anyone doubting the accuracy of this observation, or
9

WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY
MINORITY RIGHTS 26 (1995) (noting that group-specific rights may better
serve to accommodate cultural differences in some societies than universal
individual rights).
10
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 4-5 (1990) (noting that in addition to the
approval needed for any experiment using the mice, the United States
Department of Agriculture and the American Association for the Accreditation
of Laboratory Animal Care maintain control over the standard of care
provided to the experimental mice through inspection and monitoring).
11
Id. at 5.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. As the Herzog family mourned Willie’s demise, they were setting
up traps each night in an effort to eliminate the mice that infested their
kitchen. Id.
15
Id. Minow and Herzog conclude that the negative labels humans use to
refer to animals dictate the way such animals are treated by humans. Id. In a
OF
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its relevance to issues of equality, need only look to
contemporary political disputes over gay rights or reproductive
choice. When the gay community demands equality, the Christian
Right responds that what they really want is “special rights.”
When some women talk about “the right to choose” as an
element of religious equality, others respond by equating choice
with murder and by labeling pro-choice advocates “baby killers.”
Americans believe in equality; we don’t believe in “special
rights.” We believe in personal autonomy and respect for
different religious beliefs; we don’t condone baby-killing. He
who frames the issue wins the debate. Unfortunately, the
competition to be the first to label—to be the side that
successfully frames the issue—usually generates more heat than
light.
II. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUALITY
In the United States discussions of equality generally,
although certainly not always, begin with examining the role of
government and the meaning and application of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, passage of
which, as Akhil Reed Amar has persuasively argued, profoundly
changed the way in which America defines its constitutional
principles, including principles of equality.16
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from denying
persons within their respective jurisdictions “the equal protection
of the laws.”17 The pertinent language reads:

similar way, the labels often assigned to certain groups of people usually bear
a direct relation to the moral judgments made about those people. Id.
16
See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION
AND RECONSTRUCTION 7 (1998) (introducing his argument that the Fourteenth
Amendment has, since its passage, greatly influenced the way in which the
Bill of Rights is viewed). To the extent that people think that the Bill of Rights
applies directly to state government action, people have come to ignore the
Fourteenth Amendment itself. In reality, it underlies everyone’s thinking
because the Fourteenth Amendment created the avenue for applying the Bill of
Rights to the states in the first instance. Id.
17
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.18
The language is straightforward and congressional debate
surrounding passage, as well as subsequent arguments for and
against ratification, proceeded on the assumption that the
amendment would obligate the states to “incorporate” the Bill of
Rights—that is, would impose upon the states the same
limitations that the original Bill of Rights imposed upon the
federal government.19 Nevertheless, the amendment, and
particularly its Equal Protection Clause, were subsequently
interpreted by the Supreme Court much more narrowly. The
“fundamental rights” protected by the Bill of Rights were applied
to the states very slowly, and over a period of many years.20
18

Id.
See generally AMAR, supra note 16, at 163-74, 197-206 (discussing the
politics of ratification and incorporation debate).
20
For example, in 1833 the Supreme Court held that the rights
guaranteed in the first eight amendments did not apply to state governments.
See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 249 (1833) (finding that the Fifth,
Sixth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution applied only to
the federal government and not to the states). Forty years later, in the nowinfamous Slaughter-House Cases, the Court held that those same eight
amendments were not “privileges and immunities” of citizenship. See 83 U.S.
36, 81 (1872) (noting, “we are of opinion that the rights claimed by these
plaintiffs in error, if they have any existence, are not privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States within the meaning of the clause of
the fourteenth amendment under consideration”). Subsequently, in a series of
cases, the Court gradually read the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as “incorporating” fundamental liberties, making those guarantees
that could be deemed fundamental binding on the States. For an overview of
the evolution of the incorporation doctrine, see generally Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (finding the exemption from self-incrimination
under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution as not
19
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Even after the Equal Protection Clause was so applied, early
notions of equal protection accommodated treatment that was
“separate but equal.” Not until Brown v. Board of Education in
1954 did the Supreme Court conclude that separate was
inherently unequal.21
The equality protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is not
the equality proposed by political philosophers. Rather, the
amendment is consistent with the founders’ belief that liberty is
essentially defined in the negative, as freedom from state
constraints on individuals’ beliefs and behaviors.22 Equality in
incorporated under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (holding that Fifth
Amendment immunity from double jeopardy is not incorporated under the
Fourteenth Amendment); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 54 (1947)
(incorporating protection against compulsory self-incrimination by fear of
hurt, torture or exhaustion under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (finding that the
Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination is
incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment); Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (applying the double jeopardy prohibition to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment on the grounds that it represents a
“fundamental ideal in constitutional heritage”).
21
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that the doctrine of “separate but
equal” holds no place in the field of public education because “separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal”). See also Gaston County, N.C.
v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) (determining it appropriate to analyze
whether a state or county has a history of separate and inferior educational
opportunities, as outlined in Brown v. Board of Education, when deciding the
fairness of a literacy test under the auspice of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
and upholding the lower court’s determination that because such a history was
present in Gaston County the literacy test was unfair and barred by the Act).
22
See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). In
Allgeyer the Court declared that:
[t]he liberty mentioned in [the Fourteenth Amendment] means not
only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint
of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace
the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties;
to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he
will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any
livelihood or avocation; and for that purpose to enter all contracts
which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a
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that sense is limited to our right to be treated equally by
government. Equal protection analysis thus begins with an
inquiry as to whether there has been state action, without which
there is no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.23
Once it is determined that state action is present, courts apply
an elaborate “tiered” analysis that hinges upon the nature of the
classification involved and the precision with which the
government action has been focused. As Randall Kelso
explained:
[t]he first inquiry is what governmental interests support a
statute’s constitutionality. Depending upon the standard of
review, the governmental interests must be legitimate or
permissible; important, substantial, or significant; or
compelling or overriding. Of course, the governmental
interest may be impermissible or illegitimate, and thus not
support the statute under any standard of review.24
successful conclusion of the purposes above mentioned.
Id. See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847, 851 (1992). In
Casey the Court explained:
[i]t is a promise of our Constitution that there is a realm of personal
liberty which the government may not enter. . . . Our law affords
constitutional protection to personal relations relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education. These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
23

This search is not as simple as it may seem. State action jurisprudence
is virtually incoherent, with serious consequences beyond the scope of this
article. See generally Sheila S. Kennedy, When is Private Public? State Action
in the Era of Privatization and Private-Public Partnerships, 11 GEO. MASON
U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 203 (2001) (emphasizing that under the state action
doctrine, public invasions of rights are constitutionally prohibited, while the
Fourteenth Amendment affords no protection against private conduct).
24
R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection
Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The
“Base Plus Six” Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 225, 227 (2002).
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Subsequent inquiries focus upon the methods employed to
advance those governmental ends.25 Under the rational basis test,
if the government’s interest is “legitimate” or “permissible,” the
law must be rationally related to its objective.26 A second tier,
commonly known as intermediate scrutiny, requires that where
the interest is “important, substantial or significant” there must
be a more substantial nexus, or connection, between the means
and the end.27 If a given law targets a suspect class or impinges
upon a fundamental interest, the governmental interest must be
“compelling” and a direct relationship must be demonstrated in
accordance to “strict scrutiny” standards.28 Where heightened
scrutiny is applied, either intermediate or strict, a final level of
analysis focuses upon whether the law in question has been
narrowly tailored to achieve its ends—such that it avoids
imposing a burden greater than necessary to the achievement of
the desired ends.29
Most challenges to equal protection are decided under the
“rational basis” test and it is an unusual law that fails to pass
muster under this standard, which is highly deferential to the
state.30 However, certain classifications have been determined
25

See generally id.
Id. at 227.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 228.
29
Id. at 234.
30
Id. at 230-32. One notable exception is Romer v. Evans, in which the
Supreme Court struck down an amendment to the Colorado State Constitution,
holding that animus toward a particular group of people—here, homosexuals—
could never constitute a legitimate state purpose. 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
The Court noted:
[Colorado’s amendment] fails, indeed defies, even this conventional
inquiry. First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a
broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an
exceptional and . . . invalid form of legislation. Second, its sheer
breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the
amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the
class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state
interests.
Id.
26
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inherently suspect and require closer examination by the courts.
Race, national origin and alienage will trigger strict scrutiny, as
will laws burdening a fundamental right. The categories requiring
strict scrutiny are those where members of the group share an
immutable characteristic, have historically suffered pervasive
discrimination, and where efforts to vindicate their rights in the
political arena are unlikely to succeed. Categories that will be
examined under “heightened,” but not strict, scrutiny include, for
example, gender and legitimacy.31
As the above, somewhat cursory, overview of equal
protection analysis illustrates, the Supreme Court has fashioned a
highly technical template to determine whether there has been a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. There is substantial
scholarship suggesting that the Court has not hesitated to
manipulate this template to serve political or ideological ends.32 It
is certainly the case that equal protection jurisprudence has
evolved without the benefit of any overarching, generally
accepted theory of equality, negative or positive. It should not
come as a surprise, therefore, that equal protection case law is
anything but coherent, nor that political constituencies
unschooled in the arcane language of legal analysis view much of
it as unfair and decidedly unequal. Because the stability of a
society depends in large measure upon the extent to which
members of that society feel they are treated justly, this popular
31

See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 681 (13th ed. 1997) (stating that gender, alienage and illegitimacy have
evoked “varying, and often unstable” degrees of heightened scrutiny). This
remains true even in contemporary society, although the latter seems quaint in
these days of celebrity unwed motherhood. When one considers that
illegitimacy will trigger heightened scrutiny while the Court has thus far been
unwilling to accord even quasi-suspect status to sexual orientation, it would
seem past time to revisit the tiers of current equal protection jurisprudence.
32
See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Tears for Tiers on the Rhenquist Court, 4 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 350, 371 (2002) (arguing that the tiers of equal protection
scrutiny are “a vessel into which the Justices pour their values”); R. Randall
Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause, supra note
24, at 226 (2002) (arguing that six or seven different levels of equal protection
scrutiny are used, instead of the traditional three, to accommodate the Justices’
beliefs).
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resentment is no small matter. If the rules promulgated by the
state are believed by large segments of the citizenry to differ
substantially from their internalized notions of fair play and equal
treatment, the consequences for legal legitimacy and voluntary
compliance can be quite negative.
The disparity between popular understanding of equality and
its legal or constitutional definition takes on added urgency as
government becomes a more pervasive element of citizens’
everyday experiences. In a society where the operations of the
state reach increasingly into areas that were previously entirely
private, the ways that state conducts business, uses its power to
shape law and provide for the common welfare become critical
elements in the formation of that society, and the degree to which
that society values or devalues particular notions of equality.33
III. NEUTRALITY AND EQUALITY
It is impossible to understand the political passions aroused
by affirmative action, charitable choice, or any other government
action that specifically recognizes difference in order to achieve
equality, without first understanding the importance Americans
attach to governmental neutrality. As I have written elsewhere,
the one thing most Americans will agree upon, at least publicly,
is that our goal is the establishment of a society in which skin

33

Not only do contemporary laws and regulations address numerous areas
of American life that were hitherto unregulated, government programs such as
social security and welfare, and government agencies like the Small Business
Administration, the United States Civil Rights Commission, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, and many others, are part of the
landscape of even the average citizen. See, e.g., D.J. GALLIGAN,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW xi (1992). Galligan posits that:
[t]he rise of the welfare state and the regulation of social and
economic activity have meant a substantial expansion of government
in the middle and later years of the twentieth century. New and wide
ranging legislative programmes have been developed; a host of new
authorities have been created, and the lives of citizens have been
much controlled and regulated.
Id.
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color, gender and the like are officially irrelevant.34 Most of us
really do want a society where people are judged by their actions,
talents and “the content of their characters,” where the same,
neutral rules apply to everyone in equal measure.35
If one believes that it is profoundly immoral to disadvantage
someone on the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation or other
aspects of one’s fundamental identity, it seems morally and
intellectually inconsistent to award advantage on that same basis.
Furthermore, programs that single out particular groups for
protection or other special treatment raise the specter of misuse
of government power: how do we ensure that such programs are
based upon a desire to remedy demonstrable inequalities and not
on considerations of political or other advantage? If government
can “bend the rules” for one group, what is to keep it from
advantaging others who are less deserving? How shall we define
desert for such purposes?
Of course, legal discourse discussing neutrality runs into
many of the same problems encountered in discussions of
equality. If African-Americans have been enslaved, stigmatized
and segregated over the past three hundred years, how “neutral”
is a system that removes legal barriers but does nothing to
remedy the personal and structural effects of those experiences?
Because official neutrality, like equality, is highly valued but
rarely defined, it is often argued that applying special rules to
certain groups actually furthers more general neutrality.36 As
34

SHEILA KENNEDY, WHAT’S A NICE REPUBLICAN GIRL LIKE ME DOING
ACLU? 182-91 (1997) (postulating in part that the approach of
traditional Republicanism to questions of equality was similar to that of civil
libertarians in that both were suspicious of government intrusions).
35
Id.
36
See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses in
Terms of Liberty, Equality and Free Speech Values: A Critical Analysis of
“Neutrality Theory” and Charitable Choice, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 243 (1999). Brownstein criticizes neutrality theory on three bases.
Id. at 246-47. First, he argues that neutrality theory is a misnomer because it
encourages decisions that favor religious choices. Id. Second, by focusing
solely on government interference with religion and liberty, it ignores other
constitutional values affected by charitable choice laws. Id. at 247. Third, the
theory ignores “the positive role that government should play in promoting
AT THE
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noted by Alan Brownstein, proponents of charitable choice use
“neutrality theory” to justify a form of affirmative action for
faith-based organizations.37 Brownstein stated:
The goal of neutrality theory, according to Esbeck, is to
‘maximize [ ] religious liberty.’ That objective is best
accomplished by the minimization of the government’s
influence over personal choices concerning religious
beliefs and practices. The goal is realized when
government is neutral as to the religious choices of its
citizens. Thus, whether pondering the constitutionality of
exemptions from regulatory burdens or as to equal
treatment as to benefit programs, in both situations the
integrating principle is neutralizing the impact of
government action on personal religious choices. 38
religious liberty and equality.” Id. See also Susanna Dokupil, A Sunny Dome
with Caves of Ice: The Illusion of Charitable Choice, 5 TEX. L. & REV. POL.
149, 198 (2000) (suggesting that neutrality theory is biased in favoring some
religious organizations over others because it will invariably result in greater
benefits to larger religious institutions with more resources and political
influence).
37
Brownstein, supra note 36, at 246-56. Brownstein advocates a holistic
approach to scrutiny of charitable choice proposals. Id. at 249. First, he
acknowledges the basis for some preferential treatment of religious
organizations as “constitutionally justified, if not required.” Id. Brownstein
further recognizes that other decisions that may disadvantage religious
organizations, such as access to state benefits, may be warranted as a result of
that preferential treatment. Id. Brownstein notes that, “[i]f regulatory
exemptions result in incentives favoring religion, the granting of exemptions
creates an imbalance in the constitutional ledger that may help justify other
decisions, creating countervailing incentives, that move the system closer to
equilibrium.” Id.
38
Id. at 245 (quoting Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for
Governmental Cooperation with Faith Based Social Service Providers, 46
EMORY L.J. 1, 27 (1997)) [hereinafter Esbeck, Constitutional Case]. Esbeck,
Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General, participated in drafting the
charitable choice legislation and advocated before Congress for its passage.
See Brownstein, supra note 36, at 234; Carl H. Esbeck, Statement Before the
United States House of Representatives Concerning Charitable Choice and
Community Solutions Act, 16 J. NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 567,
568 (2002) [hereinafter Esbeck, Concerning Charitable Choice]. Esbeck
argues that government should minimize its impact on religious organizations
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Neutrality theory implements this integration by
“distinguishing between burdens and benefits.”39 Under its
operational rules, minimization of government influence is
achieved by: “(1) allowing religious providers equal access to
[state] benefits, and (2) allowing them separate relief from
regulatory burdens.”40
In other words, Esbeck defines “neutrality” in this context as
special dispensation from rules of otherwise general application—
as tilting the level playing field.41 As Professor Brownstein notes,
however, “granting an exemption from a general law confers
substantial material benefits” much as if a particular religious
group were excused from payment of an onerous, but generally
applicable, tax.42 Comparing such an approach to the neutrality
theory underpinning free speech principles, Brownstein argues
that by providing special regulatory exemptions for proponents of
a religious point of view, but not for proponents of other, secular
viewpoints, programs like charitable choice may distort the
marketplace of ideas and run afoul of the First Amendment.43
when determining eligibility criterion for federal funding of social service
programs. See Esbeck, Constitutional Case, supra at 24.
39
Esbeck, Constitutional Case, supra note 38, at 24. According to
Esbeck, religious organizations should be allowed equal access to benefits, but
should be granted separate relief from regulatory burdens. Id. He suggests that
this “best of both worlds” approach is precisely what the First Amendment
was designed to encompass. Id. at 27.
40
Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
41
Id. at 20-21. See also Brownstein, supra note 36, at 251 (critiquing
Esbeck for ignoring that neutrality of government spending decisions is a
sham).
42
Brownstein, supra note 36, at 261.
43
Id. at 271. Other commentators have made similar suggestions as to
potential First Amendment concerns and infringements raised by charitable
choice initiatives and legislation. See, e.g., Michelle Dibadj, The Legal and
Social Consequences of Faith-Based Initiatives and Charitable Choice, 26 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 529, 556 (2002) (arguing that Faith-Based Initiatives offer
protection for religious organizations resulting in preferential treatment over
non-religious organizations); Carmen M. Guerricagoitia, Innovation Does Not
Cure Constitutional Violation: Charitable Choice and the Establishment
Clause, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 447, 472-73 (2001) (stating that
charitable choice violates any of the three principles of the Establishment
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IV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND CHARITABLE CHOICE
Disputes over the nature of fundamental fairness and genuine
equality have figured prominently in political debate and
litigation over affirmative action programs. One element of that
debate centers upon the appropriate level of analysis; that is, to
what extent should courts take note of the history of black
Americans as a group, and to what extent should judicial
remedies address discrimination against discrete, identifiable
individuals?44 The American legal system is uncomfortable with
the claims of so-called “identity politics.” Unlike the legal
systems in countries described by Kymlicka, ours has historically
focused on individual rights and responsibilities, and Americans
are profoundly uncomfortable when individual merit and
behavior are not the primary focus of legal analysis.45 For
example, it has been noted that:
[t]he official American vision of equality has been one of
Clause, secular purpose, coercion and endorsement, and is therefore
unconstitutional).
44
See generally Sandra Levitsky, Reasonably Accommodating Race:
Lessons From the ADA For Targeted Affirmative Action, 18 LAW & INEQ. 85,
111 (2000) (citing various views on affirmative action). Levitsky notes
evidence that most Americans “do not approve of remedies to persistent
inequality that grant rewards on the basis of group membership rather than
individual merit” and that “[a] successful affirmative action measure will
necessarily have to contain then, an individual based remedy.” Id.
45
See generally KYMLICKA, supra note 9, at 57 (attributing a negative
attitude toward international protection of national minorities to the League of
Nation’s minority protection scheme, which facilitated the Nazi aggression in
Czechoslovakia and Poland). Kymlicka notes that providing that separation of
church and state as a resolution to the growing conflict between Catholics and
Protestants in European countries in the sixteenth century resulted in an
entrenchment of individual freedom of religion and oppression of religious
minorities. Id. at 3. Additionally, he notes the uniqueness of Canadian
federalism for its accommodation of both individual and “group-specific
community rights.” Id. at 26-27. He also asserts that the instability of the
former Soviet Union arising from disputes over boundaries, local autonomy,
language, and naturalization could have been resolved by restoring the rights
of minority groups, rather than relying solely on general human rights
principles. Id. at 5.
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a society in which group identity is legally irrelevant,
where individual conduct is the only proper concern of
government, and individual merit the only determinant of
reward in the workplace. In such a system, individuals are
rewarded or punished based upon their behavior and
performance. Race, religion, sex, and similar markers of
group affiliation are unrelated to one’s legal or
employment status, despite how meaningful those
affiliations may be to the individual. The civil rights
movement spoke so powerfully to the nation’s conscience
because the treatment of minorities was blatantly
inconsistent with our stated commitment to equality and
fundamental fairness.46
Both the original 1964 Civil Rights Act and subsequent
affirmative action programs begin by recognizing that injustices
done to black Americans as a group have harmed individual
members of that group in ways courts can neither quantify nor
fully identify, and that individualized remedies are inadequate.47
If institutionalized racism has distorted the operation of economic
and educational systems and diminished access and opportunities
available to most African-Americans, the simple cessation of
discrimination, without more, would leave many without the
means to fully enter into American life.48 To achieve genuine
equality and overcome the burdens of past discrimination,
affirmative action programs were based upon the belief that
achievement of ultimate equality required government to “tilt”

46

Sheila S. Kennedy & Richard J. Magjucka, Reducing Identity Politics
in the Workplace: A Modest Proposal, 17 MID. AM. J. BUS. 33 (2002).
47
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (2000). See
also Bernard Grofman, Civil Rights, the Constitution, Common Decency, and
Common Sense, in LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 226 (Bernard
Grofman ed., 2000) (noting that injustices done to black Americans are not
easily quantifiable and cannot always be remedied with a lawsuit); Rachel F.
Moran, Diversity Distance and the Delivery of Higher Education, in A
READER ON RACE, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN LAW 297 (Timothy Davis
et. al. eds., 2001) (noting that affirmative action laws grew out of the inability
of the courts to provide remedies on a case by case basis).
48
Id.
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the playing field.49
The extent of the tilt—the degree to which racial identity
should be a factor in employment or education decisions—has
been the subject of considerable litigation.50 Judicial opinions
have been closely divided. Indeed, as Ashutosh Bhagwat noted,
three of the most significant affirmative action cases, Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke,51 Fullilove v. Klutznick52
49

Academics, practitioners and politicians have offered multiple and
various arguments in favor of affirmative action programs. For a description
and assessment of the principal traditional arguments in support of affirmative
action, see generally Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education:
Confronting the Condition and Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521, 548, 556-67
(2002) (explaining that affirmative action initiatives are necessary for such
reasons as that otherwise all but a few black students would attend nonselective colleges, the black-white gap in social conditions would increase, the
economic status of black people would decrease and there would be socially
disruptive reactions within black communities such as increases in crime).
50
It should be noted here that a similar analysis could be made with
respect to gender, although the application of affirmative action to genderbased initiatives has been less contentious. For a discussion of this
phenomena, see generally Daniel P. Tokaji & Mark D. Rosenbaum,
Promoting Equality by Protecting Local Power: A Neo-Federalist Challenge to
State Affirmative Action Bans, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 129, 136-38 (1999)
(explaining that state laws banning sex-conscious affirmative action directly
conflict with the core constitutional principle of equal protection and showing
how a proper determination may be made regarding what, if any, sexconscious affirmative action initiatives are necessary and appropriate).
51
438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (striking down the University of California’s
affirmative action policies as requiring illegal racial quotas even though race
may be used as a factor in admissions decisions). The university’s affirmative
action policy included a separate admissions committee for economically
and/or educationally disadvantaged applicants and applicants who were of a
racial minority. Id. Such candidates were exempted from the general rule that
applicants with a grade point average of less than 2.5 were summarily rejected
admission. Id.
52
448 U.S. 448, 490 (1980) (upholding the “minority business
enterprise” provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 because
Congress had determined that extensive discrimination occurred within the
construction industry and Congress was entitled to judicial deference). The
provision required at least ten percent of federal funds granted for public work
projects be used to procure services from business owned predominately by
racial minorities. Id.
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and Wygand v. Jackson Board of Education,53 were decided by
pluralities; the Supreme Court could not even muster a majority
opinion.54
In Adarand Constructors v. Pena, the Rhenquist Court held
that all race-conscious programs, state or federal, discriminatory
or benign, are subject to strict scrutiny, thus clarifying an area of
doctrinal uncertainty about when strict scrutiny was required.55
As Bhagwat observes, however:
53

476 U.S. 267, 296 (1986) (holding a public teachers’ collective
bargaining agreement invalid on the ground that there must be convincing
evidence of prior discrimination before a public employer can use limited
racial classifications to remedy that discrimination). The bargaining agreement
protected minority teachers during layoffs and resulted in layoffs of white
teachers who had more seniority than some retained black teachers. Id.
54
See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Affirmative Action and Compelling Interests:
Equal Protection Jurisprudence at the Crossroads, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
260, 262 (2002) (noting that the lack of a majority opinion in cases addressing
the constitutionality of benign race-conscious governmental actions produced
confusion regarding the circumstances under which governments were
permitted to engage in race-conscious decision making and the applicable
standard of constitutional review in to such cases). It should be noted here,
however, that after declining to revisit the issue of affirmative action in the
context of education for twenty-four years, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari for Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), cert.
granted, 123 S. Ct. 617, 154 L. Ed. 2d 514 (2002). The Sixth Circuit
reversed the district court’s decision in favor of an unsuccessful law school
applicant that the University of Michigan’s admissions procedure violated the
Equal Protection Clause by giving preference to minority applicants. Id. at
735. The Sixth Circuit found that the school had a compelling interest in
achieving a diverse student body, and giving minority students a plus in the
admissions process for the purposes of fostering diversity does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 739, 747. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari; the Court’s decision was pending at the time of publication.
55
515 U.S. 200 (1995). In Adarand, a white subcontractor who was not
awarded a portion of a federal highway project brought an action challenging
the constitutionality of a federal program designed to provide highway
contracts to disadvantaged business enterprises. Id. at 210. The subcontractor
claimed that a benign racial classification, such as the one at issue, violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. The Tenth Circuit affirmed
summary judgment in favor of the government, but the Supreme Court
remanded the case, finding that racial classifications should be examined under
strict scrutiny. Id. at 227.
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an examination of recent decisions by the federal courts of
appeals reveals widespread disagreement and confusion
regarding the constitutionality of race-conscious official
action. Despite facial unanimity regarding the applicable
standard of review, courts differ widely in how they
implement the strict scrutiny standard. In particular, there
is an explicit and widening division among the courts of
appeals regarding the kinds of governmental objectives
that are sufficiently ‘compelling’ to justify race-based
actions that disfavor the majority race, a division the
Supreme Court has studiously avoided resolving.56
In Hopwood v. Texas, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit determined that diversity of the student body at a state
university’s law school was not sufficiently compelling to justify
an admissions policy that gave preferential treatment to AfricanAmerican and Hispanic applicants.57 The court held that, absent a
history of discrimination by the school that would justify
remedial measures, the program could not survive equal
protection scrutiny.58
56

Bhagwat, supra note 54, at 263.
78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). In Hopwood, a class of non-minority
applicants rejected by a state university law school challenged the law school’s
affirmative action admissions program as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The school utilized a Texas Index (TI)
number, a combination of undergraduate grade point average and Law School
Aptitude Test score, as a basis for admission. Id. at 935. In addition, the
school considered factors such as the strength of a student’s undergraduate
education, the difficulty of his or her major, significant trends in the student’s
grades and the qualities each applicant might bring to the law school class. Id.
Applicants with a TI number that exceeded a certain threshold were
presumptively admitted, while those below were denied. Id. at 935-36. The
plaintiffs challenged the admission process, contending that the practice of
having lower TI thresholds for black and Mexican applicants violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 938. The Fifth
Circuit, finding for the plaintiff class, noted that “[t]he law school has
presented no compelling justification, under the Fourteenth Amendment or
Supreme Court precedent that allows it to continue to elevate some races over
others, even for the wholesome purpose of correcting perceived racial
imbalance in the student body.” Id. at 934.
58
Id. at 952. Specifically, the court noted that benign racial classifications
57
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Similarly, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
struck down Federal Communications Committee regulations
intended to foster diversity in programming, declining to find any
compelling government interest in promoting broadcast
diversity.59 On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit upheld
preferential hiring of black officers to staff a boot camp in which
the young offenders were predominantly African-American,
accepting the state’s argument that the presence of black staff
members was essential to the program’s success and thus a
compelling state interest.60 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit upheld
must be strictly scrutinized, meaning that “the racial classification must serve
a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to meet that goal.” Id. at
941. The school’s admission program did not serve a compelling state interest
of remedying past discrimination because although Texas state actors had
discriminated against minorities in the past, there was no evidence that the law
school was an offending actor. Id. at 948-49. The court noted that “[b]ecause
a state does not have a compelling state interest in remedying the present
effects of past societal discrimination, however, we must examine the district
court’s legal determination that the relevant governmental entity is the system
of education within the state as a whole.” Id. at 949.
59
See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 355
(D.C. Cir. 1998). The Church challenged a FCC order finding that the
Church failed to follow the equal employment opportunity guidelines for
hiring minorities at the church’s radio station. Id. at 346. Though other
positions in the Church did not require Lutheran training, the radio positions
did, thus considerably narrowing the pool of minority applicants. Id. The
Church challenged the FCC’s race-based employment program as a violation
of equal protection provided by the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 345. The Court
found that the FCC did not define “diverse programming” and did not
establish how race brings diversity in programming and therefore, the interest
it intended to safeguard was too abstract and did not meet the equal
protection’s compelling standard. Id. at 354-55.
60
See Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 1996). Three white
correctional officers who were denied a lieutenant position over a less
qualified black applicant challenged the hiring as a violation of equal
protection. Id. at 917. The boot camp, comprised of seventy percent black
youths but only six percent black correction officers, was designed to
rehabilitate young criminals as an alternative to prison, and the program’s
success depended on the inmates taking brutal orders from drill sergeants. Id.
Using a strict scrutiny standard, the court found that expert evidence supported
the state’s argument that the correctional program would not succeed unless
there were blacks in positions of authority to get the black inmates to respond
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an admissions process for an elementary-level university
laboratory school that made race and ethnicity a part of the
admissions decision, agreeing with the university that research
goals required a representative student body.61 Thus, the interest
in safeguarding those goals was sufficiently compelling for
purposes of equal protection analysis.62
There are numerous additional cases in which federal circuit
and district courts have had to determine whether a given interest
was sufficiently “compelling” to meet the constitutional standard
under the facts of the case.63 Such determinations are necessarily
to the drills, therefore, the hiring of the black applicant was a compelling
interest. Id. at 920. This decision did not intend that the employees mirror the
composition of the inmates, just that there is some representation. Id.
61
Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061
(9th Cir. 1999). The University Elementary School (UES) is a research
laboratory that determines the needs of California’s change in population
through its own experiences with a diverse student body. Id. at 1062. To
achieve useful results, UES employed a specific admissions process aimed at
producing a student population that reflected the population of urban public
schools, including consideration of factors such as race/ethnicity, gender and
family income. Id. The parents of a student applicant who was not admitted to
the school based on the race/ethnicity criteria challenged the constitutionality
of the admissions process under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, triggering the strict scrutiny standard requiring that the Regents
show that race/ethnicity was a narrowly tailored means to serve a compelling
state interest. Id. at 1063. The circuit court affirmed the district court’s
holding that “the defendants’ interest in operating a research-oriented
elementary school is compelling.” Id. at 1064. The court also found that the
use of race/ethnicity in the admissions process was “narrowly tailored to
achieve the necessary laboratory environment.” Id. at 1067.
62
Id. at 1067. Specifically, the court noted that the California’s benefit
from the school’s development of effective techniques for use in urban public
schools was a compelling interest and the use of race/ethnicity in the school’s
admissions process was narrowly tailored to developing those techniques. Id.
The court stated that “California has a compelling interest in providing
effective education to its diverse, multi-ethnic, public school population. . . .
[The admissions process] produce[s] research results which can be used to
improve the education of California’s ethnically diverse urban public school
population.” Id.
63
A catalogue of such cases and in-depth analysis of the jurisprudence
surrounding “compelling interest” is beyond the scope of this article. For
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ad hoc, and the resulting body of equal protection jurisprudence
demonstrates—if demonstration were needed—the inherent
difficulty of using technical legal formulae as a proxy for
equality.64
Affirmative action programs geared to racial and gender
disparities are not the only administrative or legislative efforts
intended to correct prior discrimination. In 1996, Section 104 of
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, popularly
dubbed charitable choice, addressed a perceived government bias
against contracting with religious social service providers.65
thorough review and thoughtful commentary, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose
Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 300 (1997).
Bhagwat notes that in Adarand Constructors v. Pena the Supreme Court held
that any discrimination predicated upon race, including that adopted under
affirmative action, is to be analyzed under strict scrutiny and therefore
obligates the government to present a compelling justification underlying such
practice. Id. He also acknowledges that in Hopwood v. Texas the Court ruled
that a law school admissions policy favoring minority applicants for admission
was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause because promoting
student diversification “could never qualify as a ‘compelling’ government
interest.” Id. See also Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental
Interests: An Essential But Unanalyzed Term In Constitutional Adjudication,
68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 919 (1988) (discussing that the notion of “compelling
interest lacks a strong textual foundation in the Constitution,” which never
explicitly mandates or defines the term; rather “some governmental interests
can be justified on the basis of penumbras surrounding Constitutional rights”
while others may be rationalized as “among the purposes for which particular
governmental powers were authorized.”).
64
See Bhagwat, supra note 63, at 308-09 (noting that “[l]egislatures, not
courts, have the best institutional ability to identify and assess the efficacy of
means. When courts do second-guess legislative choices of this nature, they
tend to be either proceeding ad hoc or disguising their true concerns.”);
Gottlieb, supra note 63, at 937. Gottlieb notes that “the Court’s treatment of
governmental interests has become largely intuitive, a kind of ‘know it as I see
it’ approach. . . In turn, this kind of ad hoc approach is suspect as
inconsistent, unprincipled, and lacking the impartiality we require from the
Court.” Id.
65
42 U.S.C. § 604a(a)(1)(A)-(B). This section provides “[a] State may
administer and provide services . . . through contracts with charitable,
religious, or private organizations; and provide beneficiaries of assistance
under the programs . . . with certificates, vouchers, or other forms of
disbursement which are redeemable with such organizations.” Id.
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Proponents of greater involvement in the complex network of
governmental social support by grass roots religious providers
argued that Section 104 was necessary to “level the playing
field,” although religious providers like Catholic Charities,
Lutheran Social Services, Jewish Family & Children’s Services
and the Salvation Army had long histories of partnering with
government.66 Supporters of the legislation argued that confusion
over the application of First Amendment’s Establishment Clause
doctrine caused government officials to disfavor religious bidders
in some cases and impose burdensome requirements on those
with whom they did business in other cases.67 Advocates of
greater “faith-based” participation in welfare programs
encouraged states to reach out to such organizations and
encourage their participation.68 Some states, like Massachusetts,
took the position that their playing field was already level and did

66

See Sheila Kennedy & Wolfgang Bielefeld, Government Shekels
Without Government Shackles? The Administrative Challenges of Charitable
Choice, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 4 (2002).
67
See, e.g., John J. Diulio Jr., The New Civil Rights Struggle, WALL ST.
J., June 20, 2002, at A16. Diulio, a professor at University of Pennsylvania,
Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute and former director of the White
House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, noted that
“[o]pponents of President Bush’s Faith-Based Initiative [have] rushed to claim
that government funding of faith-based organizations providing social welfare
services violates the establishment clause of the First Amendment.” Id. He
further argued, “in their purported fidelity to Constitutional values, they have
overlooked the implication of an equally important amendment, the 14th.” Id.
See also Lewis D. Solomon & Matthew J. Vlissides, Jr., Faith-Based
Charities and the Quest to Solve America’s Social Ills: A Legal and Policy
Analysis, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 265, 267 (2001) (stating that some
faith-based advocates believe there should be legislation to level the playing
field between religious and secular charitable organizations because as the law
stands now religious programs are not treated equally).
68
See Amy L. Sherman, A Report on Charitable Choice Implementation
in 15 States, (Hudson Institute/Faith in Communities, Charlottesville, VA),
2002, available at http://www.hudsonfaithincommunities.org/articles/Final
ExecSummBroch.pdf. See also Esbeck, Constitutional Case, supra note 38, at
26; Solomon & Vlissides, Faith-Based Charities and the Quest, supra note 67,
at 267.
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little to specifically implement charitable choice.69 Others, like
Indiana, instituted extensive, and relatively expensive, programs
designed to acquaint small religious providers with opportunities
for government collaborations.70 These efforts to include faithbased organizations (FBOs) have raised many of the same
questions as traditional affirmative action programs.
Perhaps the thorniest of these issues involves application of
bid qualifications: shall the same criteria be applied to FBOs as
are applied to secular providers? In an article published in
Commentary, Leslie Lenkowsky argued for “elimination of
arbitrary rules that allow, for example, the use of professional
therapy but not pastoral counseling.”71 As with affirmative
action, equal treatment is in the eye of the beholder: if the state
insists that a responsive bidder employ licensed social workers or
credentialed drug therapists, does that requirement discriminate
against FBOs whose programs use pastors rather than social
workers or trained counselors? On the other hand, if the state
relaxes certification requirements for FBOs, does this amount to
an unconstitutional preference for religious providers? What is
the difference between “equal treatment” and “special rights”?72
69

See Solomon & Vlissides, Faith-Based Charities and the Quest, supra
note 67, at 281, citing THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE, CHARITABLE
CHOICE COMPLIANCE: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD (Oct. 5, 2000) (reporting
that in addition to Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, Mississippi, and
Vermont claim that charitable choice is an option they can ignore), available
at http://downloads.weblogger.com/gems/cpj/50StateRpt.pdf.
70
See Laureen Fagan, Indiana Leads in Faith-based Initiatives, S. BEND
TRIB., June 27, 2002.
71
Leslie Lenkowsky, Funding the Faithful: Why Bush is Right, 111
COMMENT. 19, 23 (2001) (rebutting the various arguments that have been
advanced in opposition to President Bush’s plans for government support of
faith-based organizations and offering solutions to alleviate some of the
concerns raised).
72
In testimony before Senate Committee on the Judiciary, John L. Avery
of the National Association of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse Counselors
(NAADAC) focused upon precisely this issue, saying that “NAADAC’s
concern is not with who provides care, but rather by what clinical standards
that care is provided.” Faith Based Solutions: What are the Legal Issues?:
Hearing on S.304 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong.
(2001) (statement of John L. Avery, Director of Government Relations,
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Similarly, provisions of Section 104 that allow FBOs to
discriminate on the basis of religion in employment have been
widely attacked, by secular and religious organizations alike, as
special accommodation unwarranted by public policy.73
Defenders of the provisions respond that a failure to recognize
and accommodate the religious nature of FBOs would amount to
a special burden on faith and would be discriminatory.74
Lost in the arguments about fair play and equal treatment are
cautionary notes sounded by social science researchers who warn
that competition between groups is more polarizing than
competition between individuals:
[t]aking more for one’s group seems to be more legitimate
than taking more for oneself, even though one benefits in
both cases. Implicit in the act of allocating to one’s group
NAADAC), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/oldsite/te060601jla.htm.
As I have written elsewhere, “[i]f FBOs believe insistence on evidence of
“clinical competency” is discriminatory, and NAADAC believes that failure to
require such evidence is malpractice, it is no wonder that many public
administrators feel caught in an untenable situation.” Kennedy & Bielefeld,
supra note 66, at 7.
73
Both secular and non-secular groups oppose charitable choice because
of fear of discrimination in hiring and provision of services. For example, The
Interfaith Alliance has taken a position against charitable choice legislation, in
part because of the potential for “discrimination toward members of minority
faiths and ethnic traditions who are in need of assistance” and “the potential
for employment discrimination against non-believers or members of religions
differing from that of the provider.” Position of the Interfaith Alliance on
Charitable Choice Legislation, The Interfaith Alliance, available at www.inter
faithalliance.org/Initiatives/ccpos.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2003). The
American Civil Liberties Union has also issued statements against faith-based
initiatives. See Latest Government Funding of Controversial Religious
Programs One More Reason Not to Pass Faith-Based Plan Without
Protections, American Civil Liberties Union, Oct. 9, 2002, (noting that “[t]he
Bush Administration seems determined to ignore Congress and continues to
argue that faith-based organizations should have the right to discriminate in
hiring against people based on their religion in publicly funded programs.”),
available at www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.cfm?ID=10854&c=37.
74
See Paul Taylor, The Costs of Denying Religious Organizations The
Right to Staff On a Religious Basis When They Join Federal Social Service
Efforts, 12 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 159, 169-74 (2002) (defending
discrimination on the basis of religion in hiring practices).
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is the justification that other people will benefit: there
exists the possibility that taking more for one’s group may
reflect the individual’s genuine concern with the welfare
of fellow group members and not just greedy
behavior. . .The problem arises when one’s opponent in
the negotiation is also representing his/her group.75
Whatever one’s position on the merits of particular
affirmative action programs or versions of charitable choice, the
controversy each has aroused is indisputable.76 No matter what
rules the courts ultimately impose, some will feel betrayed—and
unequal. Further restrict or eliminate affirmative action, and
those who have borne the brunt of America’s racist history will
say that they do not have equal access to the playing field.
Confirm those same programs and others will complain that
special efforts to redress past injuries that benefit an entire group
are too broad and inherently unequal. Tell religious organizations
that they must meet the same standards as secular service
providers, and they will argue that such a position fails to take
into account their essential nature and is discriminatory. Make
special rules for such organizations and their secular competitors
will protest that the playing field has been unfairly tilted. Where
you stand, as the saying goes, depends upon where you sit.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
What are the implications for government legitimacy and the
75

Kristina A. Diekmann, Ann E. Tenbrunsel & Max H. Bazerman,
Fairness, Justification, and Dispute Resolution, in WORKPLACE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: DIRECTIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 196 (Sandra E. Gleason
ed., 1997) (arguing that although fairness constrains decision-making and
negotiation, a person will nevertheless maximize his or her personal outcome
if it can be justified and that the presence of a group may make the selfserving motivation less obvious, allowing for even more self-interested
behavior).
76
Regardless of one’s personal opinion on the relative strengths or ills of
affirmative action and charitable choice initiatives, the one assertion upon
which all groups can agree is that all groups do not agree. See generally supra
notes 43, 49, 72, 73 (setting forth various argument both for and against the
programs).
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rule of law if significant constituencies experience government
programs as biased or unfair? A few come to mind. First,
democratic deliberation becomes problematic. We have already
seen how proponents and opponents of affirmative action and
charitable choice “talk past each other.” In a very real sense,
they are inhabitants of different realities. But democracies require
common ground to function, and some agreement on the nature
of equality would seem to be a precondition for finding that
common ground. Second, compromise becomes difficult, if not
impossible. If different people see different realities, how can we
formulate policies that all will consider to be fair and equal?
Third, social stability is jeopardized. If government is to be seen
as legitimate, it must live up to its own principles. In America,
equality is a—perhaps the—foundational precept. When a
significant segment of our society believes that it is being
marginalized, devalued or treated in a discriminatory manner, or
that others are being unfairly privileged, there is a real potential
for social upheaval.
What, if anything, can public administrators—those on the
front lines—do to foster public perceptions of fair play by the
state? While it falls to policymakers to fashion laws that attempt
to bridge very different perceptions of equal treatment,
administrators are not without tools of their own. At a minimum,
those charged with administering the laws must take care to do so
in as evenhanded a fashion as possible. Where rules prescribe
different treatment for members of different groups,
administrators must clarify that they are acting pursuant to the
law, and not on the basis of personal bias. Whenever possible,
they should explain the purpose of laws that may be perceived as
favoring some groups over others.
These actions, of course, are all aspects of the
professionalism that we expect from public administrators.77 But
77

See generally Anthony M. Bertelli & Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., A Precept
of Managerial Responsibility: Securing Collective Justice In Institutional
Reform Litigation, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 317 (2001). The authors note that
“[professionalism] allows a cadre of professionals—public administrators of
human service agencies—to interpret the laws that govern them, and to work
towards collective justice—providing adequate services to most beneficiaries at
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administrators can and should do more: they should give
policymakers the benefit of their street level experiences. If
programs are not working, no matter how well intentioned, they
need to be modified. If misconceptions are rampant, those must
be addressed through public education. Most importantly, public
administrators need to remind citizens and policymakers alike of
the importance of maintaining the principle of government
neutrality toward those who are similarly situated. It is one thing
to engage in outreach to identify those who may be wary of
working with government or build to help potential bidders meet
a legitimate professional standard. It is quite another to relax the
standard. The first path adds substance to public resources, the
second sows distrust and discord.
CONCLUSION
Eventually, if America manages to eradicate the vestiges of
slavery and segregation, the nation may no longer need
affirmative action. Even ardent proponents of charitable choice
have suggested that replacing direct contracts with vouchers
allowing program recipients to choose their own social service
provider might ease both the First Amendment and fairness
issues, although such policies raise substantial concerns about the
marketization of public goods. But the need to define the nature
of equality and equal treatment, to sketch the landscape of truly
level playing field and provide clear guideposts for the public
officials who must administer government programs, will
remain—a daunting but absolutely essential task of liberal
democracy.

the expense of the constitutional rights of a few.” Id. at 332.

